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A CAUTIONARY NOTE ON TESTS FOR INCENTIVE 
INCOMPATIBILITY AND STARTING-POINT BIAS 
David Aadland and Arthur J. Caplan 
ABSTRACT 
In a recent study by John Whitehead in 2002 ("Incentive Incompatibility and Starting-
Point Bias in Iterative Valuation Questions"), he proposes incentive-incompatibility and starting-
point-bias tests for iterative willingness-to-pay questions. We show that if restrictions associated 
with the nature of starting-point bias are not imposed on the estimation, one obtains inconsistent 
estimates of the structural parameters and may draw inaccurate conclusions regarding the extent 
of incentive incompatibility and starting-point bias in contingent-valuation survey data. 
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A CAUTIONARY NOTE ON TESTS FOR INCENTIVE 
INCOMPATIBILITY AND STARTING-POINT BIAS1* 
1. Introduction 
In a recent study, Whitehead (2002) proposes incentive-incompatibility and starting-
point-bias tests for iterative dichotomous-choice willingness-to-pay questions. The tests 
represent a potentially important contribution because they provide a straightforward and 
relatively simple method to detect and control for two well-documented problems associated 
with discrete-choice contingent-valuation survey data (Boyle, Bishop, and Welsh, 1985; Herriges 
and Shogren, 1996; Cameron and Quiggin, 1994; Alberini, Kanninen, and Carson, 1997). In this 
note, we show that failure to impose certain restrictions implied by the nature of starting-point 
bias will lead to inconsistent estimates of the structural parameters. Using a Monte Carlo 
simulation, we find that failure to impose these restrictions leads to a substantial overestimate of 
starting-point bias and evidence of incentive incompatibility even when none exists in the actual 
data. Our theoretical arguments are laid out in Section 2 and supported with a simple Monte 
Carlo experiment in Section 3. Section 4 concludes. 
2. Theoretical Model 
Consider the valuation of a public good via a double-bounded dichotomous-choice 
questionnaire. 2 As in Whitehead (2002) and Herriges and Shogren (1996), assume that 
respondent i, i = 1, ... , n, is given an initial bid Ali and answers "yes" ifher true willingness to 
pay, WTPli, is greater than Ali and answers "no" otherwise. Assume the respondent's true 
willingness to pay is generated according to 
lThe authors acknowledge support from the National Science Foundation grant #0108159. 
2For simplicity, we only consider the double-bounded dichotomous-choice model. Extending the model to 
allow for multiple dichotomous-choice questions is a straightforward exercise. 
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(1) 
where Xi is a vector of explanatory variables observable to the researcher, J3 is a vector of 
coefficients, and Ei is an unobservable i.i.d. normally distributed error term. If the respondent 
answers "yes" to the initial willingness-to-pay question, then a follow-up bid A2i > Ali is given, 
otherwise A2i < Ali.3 The respondent's answer to this follow-up question is determined by the 
WTP function 
WTP2i = (1- y)WTPli + yAli + 8. (2) 
WTP2i is therefore a weighted average of the true willingness to pay and the opening bid plus a 
"shift" parameter, 8. Starting-point bias (i.e., "anchoring" to the initial bid) exists if 0 < Y < 1 
and does not exist if y = O. Likewise, incentive incompatibility exists (does not exist) if 8 < 0, 
(8 = 0). 
Whitehead (2002) then proposes an empirical test for starting-point bias and incentive 
incompatibility by creating a pseudo-panel dataset and estimating the parameters using a 
random-effects probit model. According to (1) and (2), the probability that the ith respondent 
answers "yes" to the /h question, j = 1,2, is 
(3) 
where <l> represents the standard normal cumulative density function, cr represents a constant 
error variance, D2 = 1, Dl = 0, and A ji = (1- J3 A)A jiD j' Other than specifying logarithmic 
willingness to pay, there are two crucial differences between (3) and Whitehead's equation (10)-
both of which are associated with restrictions related to the nature of the starting-point bias. 
First, Whitehead omits the Aji term altogether, which leads to inconsistent estimates of the 
3Without loss of generality, we assume that A2i = 2Ali when the initial willingness-to-pay question is 
answered "yes" and A2i = O.SAJi when answered "no." 
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parameters (Greene 2003, page 679). Second, it must be recognized-based on equation (2)-that 
the parameters in (3) are interrelated according to 
~y = y/(1-y) (4 a) 
(4b) 
(4c) 
Failure to impose these restrictions leads to inefficient (and if Aji is omitted, inconsistent) 
estimates of the structural parameters.4 We now tum to a Monte Carlo experiment, which serves 
to support our theoretical arguments. 
3. Monte Carlo Experiment 
Begin by assuming that respondent i's true willingness to pay is given by 
(5) 
where {Xi} are fixed draws from a uniform distribution on the (0,1) interval and {Ei} are drawn 
at random from a standard normal distribution. The willingness-to-pay value used for the second 
valuation question is given by (2). 
For this experiment, we assume that there is no incentive incompatibility (8 = 0) and a 
moderate amount of starting-point bias (y = 0.25). Based on (2) and (5), we then create 500 
artificial data sets (n = 1000 each) by drawing 500 independent sequences of {Ei}. The opening 
bids, Ali, are drawn with equal probability from the set {4,5, ... , 16}. This range is 
approximately two standard deviations above and below the expected willingness-to-pay value 
4An alternative interpretation of the differences between (3) and Whitehead's equation (10) is that the 
model with starting-point bias suffers from within-group heteroscedasticity. To see this, substitute (4a) - (4c) into 
(3), which gives Prob(WTP li > Ali) = <1>((WXi - AlYcr) and Prob(WTP2i > A2i) = <1>(((1 - y)WXi + yAli + 0-
A 2i)/cr*), where cr* = (1-y)cr. It is especially important to account for this within-group heteroscedasticity when 
estimating binary-choice models, because unlike standard regression models, it leads to inconsistent estimates of the 
structural parameters (Greene 2003, page 679). 
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of 10. The subsequent bids, A2i, are set equal to 0.5Al i ifWTP1i < Ali and 2Ali otherwise. As in 
Whitehead (2002), we create pseudo-panel data with a dependent variable equal to one if 
WTPji > Aji for j = 1,2 and zero otherwise. The parameters in (3) are estimated using a random-
effects probit model with the correlation parameter (p) for the within-group error terms set equal 
to one.5,6 This restriction on p is consistent with the theory presented above and Whitehead 
(2002), where the only fundamental error term is the group-specific one (Ei). 
In the third column of Table 1, we report the average parameter estimates across the 500 
simulations excluding Aji and without having imposed the parameter restrictions (4a)-( 4c). The 
estimates in the fourth column are based on (3) with the parameter restrictions imposed. The 
values in brackets are the cutoff values for the 90-percent confidence intervals across the 500 
simulations. Asterisks indicate that the parameter estimates are statistically different than their 
corresponding true parameter values. 
[Insert Table 1] 
Begin by focusing on the third column of Table l. For four of the model's five 
parameters, we rej ect the null hypothesis that the estimates are equal to their true values at the 
90% level. This supports the theoretical argument that the estimated parameters without 
imposing the appropriate restrictions are biased and inconsistent. It is interesting to note that 
although the true model is designed to be incentive compatible, the maximum likelihood 
estimates indicate substantial incentive incompatibility-the shift effect is roughly 30% of the 
average willingness to pay. In addition, the average estimate of starting-point bias is 
5The "within-group error terms" to which we refer are Ei and (1 - Y)Ei, the latter being implicit in (2). 
6The log likelihood function for this problem is Lf = 1 Li = 1 Y is log(p is) where s indexes the four regions 
associated with respondents' answers to the bids A I i and A2b Yis is a indicator variable equal to one if the ith 
respondent places herself in the sth region, and Pis is the probability (given by the bivariate cumulative normal 
distribution with p= 1) that the ith respondent is in the sth region. 
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approximately one and a halftimes its actual value. These biases are the direct result of having 
excluded the term Aji and not having imposed the appropriate restrictions (4a)-( 4c). 7 
Interestingly, the biases associated with the parameter estimates do not appear to bias the overall 
mean WTP estimate. 
The last column of Table 1 reports the estimates including Aji and with parameter 
restrictions (4a)-(4c) imposed. As expected, we fail to reject the null hypotheses that each 
parameter estimate is equal to its associated true value. This supports our theoretical argument 
that a modified version of Whitehead's model, one that appropriately incorporates restrictions 
associated with the nature of starting-point bias, provides a consistent method to test and control 
for starting-point bias and incentive incompatibility. Indeed, failure to impose these restrictions 
results in biased and inconsistent parameter estimates. 
4. Conclusion 
The model proposed by Whitehead (2002) provides a convenient and straightforward 
method to control for incentive compatibility and starting-point bias in a dichotomous-choice 
iterative WTP question format. However, if the restrictions implied by the structural model are 
not specifically imposed on the empirical model, inconsistent estimates are obtained for each of 
the structural parameters. We demonstrate this result with a simple Monte Carlo experiment. 
We find that the degree of starting-point bias is overstated and that incentive incompatibility 
arises even when none exists in the actual data. To obtain consistent estimates of incentive 
compatibility and starting-point bias, it is therefore necessary for researchers to impose the 
restrictions implied by Whitehead's theoretical model directly in the estimation procedure. 
7We also performed Monte Carlo experiments with n = 10,000. The results are very similar to those 
reported in Table 1, albeit with smaller confidence intervals, and are available from the authors by request. 
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Table 1. Monte Carlo Parameter Estimates (n = 1000) 
Parameters 
~o 
(Intercept) 
~1 
(Slope) 
y 
(Starting-Point 
Bias) 
8 
(Incentive 
Incompatibility) 
cr 
(Error Standard 
Deviation) 
Mean WTP 
True 
Values 
5 
10 
0.25 
o 
1 
10 
Without Parameter 
Restrictions and A 
5.374* 
[5.139,5.627] 
9.227* 
[8.845,9.619] 
0.358* 
[0.316,0.401 ] 
-3.175* 
[ -3.547,-2.812] 
0.926 
[0.825,1.019] 
9.987 
[9.839,10.136] 
With Parameter 
Restrictions and A 
4.990 
[4.743,5.253] 
10.020 
[9.582,10.476] 
0.251 
[0.223,0.274] 
0.008 
[ -0.184,0.180] 
0.990 
[0.878,1.094 ] 
10.000 
[9.852,10.149] 
Notes: The values in the last two columns are the ensemble averages across 500 independent 
simulations. The values in brackets are the lower and upper bounds for a 90% confidence 
interval. A single asterisk denotes a value that is statistically different than the true value at the 
90% confidence level. 
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